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DUELING IDEALS: BRIDGING THE GAP 
BETWEEN PEACE AND JUSTICE 
David Hine* 
Abstract: When the United Nations drafted the Rome Statute, it in-
tended to create an entity, what would eventually become the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, that would enforce criminal justice on an interna-
tional level. The Member States, upon which the authority of the ICC 
depends, are often far more concerned with simply ending the offenses 
and achieving peace than they are with prosecuting the perpetrators. As a 
result of this ideological conflict between peace and justice, the efficiency 
and value of the ICC is jeopardized. This Note discusses the current situa-
tion in Uganda as an example of the conflict of interests between a Mem-
ber State and the court. After initiating the ICC’s investigation into the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, a militant group that has plagued the northern 
region of the country for decades, Uganda has since requested that the 
prosecution of the rebel leaders be discontinued in order to achieve 
peace. By examining the interests of both the ICC and the Member 
States, this Note argues that the language of the Rome Statute has a pro-
vision which can be interpreted in a manner that would protect the 
credibility and goals of every party involved. 
Introduction 
 When the General Assembly of the United Nations (U.N.) opened 
the Rome Statute for signature on July 17, 1998, they did so with a hope 
of solidifying a global sense of respect for the enforcement of interna-
tional justice.1 The carefully constructed document appeared to pro-
vide the perfect balance between a relinquishment of prosecutorial du-
ties and a simultaneous recognition of every state’s right and duty to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes.2 In order to achieve this comfortable equilibrium between indi-
vidual state authority and the power of what would become the Interna-
                                                                                                                      
* David Hine is the Executive Articles Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. The author would like to thank Andrew Wells, Grace Twesigye, and 
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1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 
pmbl [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
2 See id. 
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tional Criminal Court (ICC), the drafters of the Rome Statute first lim-
ited the court’s jurisdiction3 and then limited the methods of admissi-
bility.4 
 Perhaps a better way to understand the drafters’ actions is to say 
that they defined what American lawyers would call the Court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and then moved on to the personal jurisdic-
tion.5 The subject matter jurisdiction of the court was limited to those 
crimes the U.N. believed posed the most serious threats to the inter-
national community as a whole: the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.6 Even those crimes do not automatically 
fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, however, for violations need to 
be admitted to the court in one of three ways, thereby fulfilling a sort 
of personal jurisdiction requirement.7 Article 13(b) provides that the 
U.N. Security Council may refer situations to the Court8 and Article 
13(c) allows the Prosecutor to initiate investigations in situations that 
seem to involve crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that are 
not otherwise being addressed.9 While each of these methods for ad-
mitting a case to the jurisdiction of the ICC seem to further the Gen-
eral Assembly’s stated goal, a resolution to guarantee lasting respect 
for the enforcement of international justice,10 there remains a third 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. art. 5(1) (“The jurisdiction of the court shall be limited to the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole. The court has jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a)The crime of genocide; 
(b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.”). 
4 Id. art. 13 (“The court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to 
in article 5 in accordance with the provision of this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one 
or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a 
State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A situation in which one or more of such 
crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or (c)The Prose-
cutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with Article 
15.”). 
5 Jamie A. Mathew, The Darfur Debate: Whether the ICC Should Determine That the Atrocities 
in Darfur Constitute Genocide, 18 Fla J. Int’l L. 517, 520 (2006); cf. Milena Sterio, The Evolu-
tion of International Law, 31 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 213, 234 (2008) (discussing the 
jurisdictional limitations of the ICC). 
6 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5 (The Statute also includes the crime of aggression, 
but Article 5(2) explains that the court will not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion until a provision has been adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123, defining 
the crime and setting out the conditions under which the court shall exercise jurisdiction 
with respect to the crime); see Mathew, supra note 5, at 520. 
7 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.13; see Mathew, supra note 5, at 520. 
8 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b). 
9 Id. art. 13(c). 
10 Id. pmbl. 
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method for admission, referrals by Member States, that has proven to 
be problematic.11 
 The issue that arises out of state referrals to the ICC comes from 
the likelihood that the referring states possess different interests and 
intentions than the court.12 While the ICC, like any other court, is fo-
cused on bringing justice to its respective jurisdiction, the referring 
state parties very often have other factors to consider, namely the 
peace and safety of their citizens.13 As a result of these different inter-
ests, a rift can be and, in fact, has been created between the ICC and 
its Member States.14 This division of parties plays the important role 
of distinguishing the oft coupled ideals of peace and justice.15 At the 
same time though, it also poses a tremendous threat to the Court; the 
ICC must address these differences and decide whether or not it 
ought to acknowledge the wishes of the Member States and abandon 
its own purpose or press on in the name of justice, despite the state 
parties’ opposition.16 
 This Note begins by summarizing the first and only example of 
this phenomenon in the ICC: the situation in Uganda with the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). It then explains the steps that were taken by 
each party, Uganda and the ICC, on the way to reaching the current 
dilemma. The Note goes on to explain why this dilemma, a conflict 
between peace and justice, is a product of the unique situation in 
Uganda as well as the Rome Statute’s language and methodology. It 
examines what the ICC stands to gain from each option going for-
ward, and also what it has to lose. Finally, this Note explains why the 
best option may, in fact, be one that the Court has to invent for itself. 
I. Background 
 The process that Uganda and the ICC had to go through to 
reach the current schism of ideals was a long, labor intensive and, 
                                                                                                                      
11 Id. art. 13(a); see Kimberly Hanlon, Peace or Justice: Now That Peace Is Being Negotiated in 
Uganda, Will the ICC Still Pursue Justice?, 14 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 295, 319–35 (2007). 
12 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 329–35; Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of In-
ternational Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International 
Criminal Law, 43 Stan. J. Int’l L. 39, 53 (2007). 
13 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 319–35. 
14 See id. 
15 Adrian Di Giovanni, The Prospect of ICC Reparations in the Case Concerning Northern 
Uganda: On a Collision Course with Incoherence?, 2 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 25, 35 (2006). 
16 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 321. 
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most importantly, violent procedure.17 After breaking away from dec-
ades of British rule in 1962, Uganda found itself dealing with the 
remnants of European colonization.18 In an effort to maintain control 
over the locals, the British had divided the country into two regions, 
the North and the South, and pitted the two areas against each 
other.19 For years, this division was exploited by overly ambitious indi-
viduals who used violence to rally one region against the other in or-
der to catapult themselves into power.20 By the middle of the 1980s, 
President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement 
had gained control of Uganda, causing members of previous govern-
ments to seek protection in northern Uganda and southern Sudan.21 
 It was from this rebellious region that, in 1986, an organization 
calling itself the Holy Spirit Movement, led by Alice Auma Lakwena, 
rose up against Museveni’s government.22 Though they were quickly 
defeated by the National Resistance Movement’s forces, the short-
lived Holy Spirit Movement gained significance in its defeat.23 A 
young relative of Lakwena, Joseph Kony, soon took over the role of 
leading the resistance, utilizing the same religious rhetoric24 as his 
predecessor and adding a political element to his fast growing organi-
zation, the LRA.25 In reality, though, the political element, a professed 
desire to overthrow Museveni and the Ugandan government, was only 
nominal.26 The LRA never had any “coherent ideology, rational po-
litical agenda or public support,” and in fact focused most of its vio-
lence on the very people for whom it claimed to be fighting, the 
Acholis in the northern region.27 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Hema Chatlani, Uganda: A Nation in Crisis, 37 Cal. W. Int’l. L.J. 277, 279–85 
(2007); Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State 
Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 403, 406–12 (2005). 
18 Chatlani, supra note 17, at 279. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. at 279–80. 
21 Id. at 280. 
22 Akhavan, supra note 17, at 406. Lakwena claimed to have supernatural spiritual pow-
ers and told her soldiers that “bathing in holy water would make bullets bounce off them 
and the stones they threw would turn into grenades.” Id. Her forces suffered heavy casual-
ties during a battle with the National Resistance Movement’s forces in late 1987, and Lak-
wena fled to Kenya. Id. 
23 See id. 
24 Chatlani, supra note 17, at 281 ( Joseph Kony claimed to have inherited the spirit of 
Lakwena and marketed himself as a “messenger of God and a liberator of the Acholi peo-
ple”). 
25 Id. 
26 See id. at 282. 
27 Akhavan, supra note 17, at 407. 
2009] The International Criminal Court: Bridging the Gap Between Peace & Justice 133 
 After 1991, Kony and his followers became increasingly violent as 
they killed and raped civilians across northern Uganda, leaving thou-
sands of maimed people in their wake.28 But apart from the LRA’s 
reputation for amputating limbs and brutally disfiguring the faces and 
bodies of its victims, the LRA also abducted thousands of children, 
forcing them to serve as child soldiers and sex slaves.29 Some estimate 
that the abducted child soldiers made up nearly eighty-five percent of 
the LRA’s forces30 while others put the figures even higher.31 Regard-
less of the precise numbers, the fact of the matter was simple: the vast 
majority of the LRA’s members were also victims of the organization’s 
torturous reign.32 It was for this reason that Uganda enacted The Am-
nesty Act in 2000, an expression of forgiveness and an attempt to end 
the conflict without any further violence.33 As a result, “from January 
2000 to June 2005, Uganda granted amnesty to over 15,000 of the 
LRA’s combatants and abductees.”34 This peaceful progress continued 
to be overshadowed by the ongoing violence, however, and on De-
cember 16, 2003, President Museveni sought outside help and re-
ferred the LRA situation to the ICC, marking the first invitation for 
the court to exercise its jurisdiction.35 
 After more than a year of investigating,36 the ICC decided that 
the situation was in fact serious enough to justify criminal prosecution 
and issued warrants for the arrest of five LRA leaders.37 Lacking a po-
lice force of its own though, the ICC had to rely on Member States, 
legally bound to enforce the Court’s warrants, to arrest the wanted 
men.38 After months of inaction, it seemed that the Court was losing 
                                                                                                                      
28 Chatlani, supra note 17, at 282. 
29 See id. 
30 Background Information on the Situation in Uganda, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/press/pressreleases/Uganda_200401_EN.doc (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
31 Chatlani, supra note 17, at 282. Chatlani made reference to an estimate that the LRA 
currently consists of approximately 200 armed commanders and 3000 child soldiers, set-
ting the child soldier contribution to nearly ninety-four percent. Id. 
32 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 304. 
33 Id. Anyone who had participated, collaborated, or assisted in the commission of any 
crime related to the war or armed rebellion could take advantage of the amnesty by re-
porting to authorities, surrendering any weapons, and renouncing their involvement in 
the rebellion. Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Di Giovanni, supra note 15, at 25 (the warrants were originally issued on July 8, 2005; 
the indictments were unsealed on October 13, 2005). 
37 Hanlon, supra note 11, at 304–05. The court issued warrants for the arrest of Joseph 
Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominci Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya. Id. 
38 See id. at 305. 
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credibility.39 In an effort to counter this shift in public perception and 
give strength to the ICC’s warrants for arrest, Interpol issued five 
wanted person notices, one for each of the men indicted by the ICC.40 
 Yet while the case against the LRA was developing in the ICC, 
and perhaps as a result of the way that things seemed to have stalled, 
President Museveni and the Ugandan government continued to push 
their amnesty policy.41 In August 2006, Museveni declared a cease-fire 
which was signed and agreed to by the LRA.42 In addition, the gov-
ernment proposed a peace deal which offered amnesty to the accused 
members of the LRA, despite their leading roles in years of “system-
atic murder, abduction, sexual enslavement and mutilation of Ugan-
dan civilians.”43 
 Today, Uganda is still pushing for amnesty and resisting the ICC’s 
decision to prosecute the leaders.44 Perhaps more important than the 
government’s decision to implement such a policy is the amount of 
domestic support it has received.45 Many Ugandans believe that for-
giveness, not the criminal justice system, is the path to a peaceful 
life.46 This is a sentiment shared not only among those who have re-
mained relatively unaffected, but also by those who have themselves 
been mutilated and tortured.47 It is this mentality and these people— 
those in search of peace—that form the ICC’s opposition.48 
II. Discussion 
 It is the state referral method of submitting a case to the ICC that 
has proven to be problematic.49 Article 13(a) of the Rome Statute al-
lows State Parties to refer potential criminal situations to the ICC for 
                                                                                                                      
39 See Di Giovanni, supra note 15, at 34–35. 
40 Id. 
41 See Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 583, 619 (2007). 
42 Jeffrey Gettleman, Uganda Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 
2006, at A1. 
43 Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 619. 
44 Id. 
45 See id; Gettleman, supra note 42, at A1. 
46 See Gettleman, supra note 42, at A1 (“Peace is more important than punishment, 
Acholi elders say, and they would rather have Mr. Kony return to Gulu for a [traditional 
Ugandan forgiveness ceremony] than rot in some European prison.”). 
47 See id. (“Typical is Christa Labol, whose ears and lips were cut off by bayonet-wielding 
prepubescent soldiers she now says she would welcome home. ‘Only God can judge,’ Mrs. 
Labol said through a mouth that is always open.”). 
48 See Di Giovanni, supra note 15, at 35; Gettleman, supra note 42, at A1. 
49 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a); Hanlon, supra note 11, at 319–35. 
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investigation.50 Article 14 goes on to explain that state referrals are 
made specifically to determine whether charges ought to be brought 
against any individuals, cutting off any further involvement by the 
state at that point.51 With that statutory purpose in mind, the state 
referral method for exercising the court’s jurisdiction appears to liken 
itself to the other two methods in that it too furthers the General As-
sembly’s goal of solidifying a global sense of respect for the enforce-
ment of international justice.52 
 The problem, as seen in the Uganda situation, arises after the 
decision to press charges has been made, for while it is unlikely that 
the Prosecutor or the Security Council would ever revoke their sup-
port for the prosecution of cases that they initiated, referring states 
have done just that.53 This apparent revocation may not ultimately 
have any effect on the Court’s actual authority to prosecute the 
crimes, but it does indicate a serious clash between the interests of 
individual sovereign nations and the interests of the greater global 
theater.54  Furthermore, the existence of such a schism stands as an 
enormous obstacle in the way of realizing the “lasting respect for the 
enforcement of international justice” for which the ICC was created.55  
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this obstacle, the State Party’s 
practical revocation, is the fact that it is not motivated by greed or by 
violence, but instead by a desire for peace; peace, that is to say, is 
standing directly in the way of justice.56 
 With the division now more clearly defined as a split between a 
sovereign state’s desire for peace and the court’s ambitions for justice, 
and continuing to use the Uganda situation as an example, one can 
examine the different options that the ICC has available.57 One op-
                                                                                                                      
50 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a). 
51 Id. art. 14(1) (“A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or 
more crimes within the jurisdiction of the court appear to have been committed request-
ing the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one 
or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes.”) 
52 Id. pmbl., arts. 13(b), (c) & 14. 
53 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 329–35. 
54 See  Di Giovanni, supra note 15, at 35; Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 619–20. 
55 Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.; see Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 619–20. 
56 See Di Giovanni, supra note 15, at 35. 
57 See generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, War Is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the 
Prohibition of Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts, 20 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 57 
(2006); James D. Kole, Lessons of Peace Through Justice, Chi. Daily L. Bull. 6 (Nov. 1, 2006); 
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International Crimi-
nal Court, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 385 (2005); Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., First Step on Long, Arduous 
Trip, Chi. Daily L. Bull. 5 (Oct. 21, 2005). 
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tion is for the ICC to simply exercise the authority that Uganda gave 
the Court when it submitted its referral.58 Taking such action could be 
the very thing the ICC needs to finally realize its goal of establishing a 
sense of respect for the enforcement of international justice.59 As 
James D. Kole points out, “[i]n the long run peace does require jus-
tice. History teaches that accumulated injustices eventually lead to 
violence.”60 Certainly one must acknowledge the difficulties that such 
tactics cause for those in search of peace, but never, says Kole, should 
justice be denied or delayed to lessen those hardships; justice is a nec-
essary element on the road to peace.61 
 There are some who also believe that denying Uganda’s request 
to drop the indictments is the right thing to do, but are driven by a 
different motivation: deterrence.62 As Nsongurua Udombana argues, 
“[i]f the ICC succeeds in bringing the LRA to justice, then it may de-
ter others currently engaging in or contemplating mass atrocities.”63 
The ICC could simply acknowledge that immediate peace in Uganda 
may be secondary to a plan that would discourage further atrocities 
around the world and save millions of lives.64 
 The problem with this first option is that the court still lacks any 
reliable way of apprehending the indicted men.65 Without any police 
force, the ICC would be forced to rely upon the Ugandan govern-
ment, a government whose wishes the ICC will have recently disre-
garded, to produce them.66 The ICC would be crippling Uganda’s 
opportunity to negotiate for peace in order to realize something that 
the ICC is literally powerless to attain without Uganda’s help.67 Some, 
like Udombana, believe this is a mere hiccup in the international jus-
tice system and should be no cause for concern, claiming instead that 
“the international community must take comfort in the fact that there 
is no time bar for these crimes.”68 Even if Uganda must endure years 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Udombana, supra note 57, at 102–03. 
59 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.; Udombana, supra note 57, at 102–03. 
60 Kole, supra note 57. 
61 Id. 
62 See Udombana, supra note 57, at 103. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. 
65 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 305. 
66 See id; Udombana, supra note 57, at 103. 
67 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 305; Udombana, supra note 57, at 103. 
68 Udombana, supra note 57, at 103. 
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of war before the indicted men are arrested, the result will have been 
well worth the wait, for justice is the ultimate goal.69 
 Others take a very different approach, viewing the court’s inabil-
ity to enforce its policies as a sign of its fragility.70 In their article, 
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman warn that “the fail-
ure of governments will simply become the failure of the ICC.”71 The 
solution to this problematic scenario introduces a second option for 
the ICC: turn the issue back over to Uganda.72 Rather than deter-
rence, one motivation behind the second option is the notion of 
holding Member States accountable for their own political prob-
lems.73 Uganda has been unable to end the civil war within its borders 
for two decades, and while the referral to the ICC technically asked 
for help in dealing with human rights violators, the referral also effec-
tively asked the ICC to end the conflict.74 This, of course, is something 
the ICC is not designed to do.75 Or, as Arsanjani and Reisman phrase 
the issue, “If neither [military action nor negotiation] has proven ef-
fective, what will referral of the situation to the ICC accomplish?”76 
The answer is simple: nothing, because the ICC, a court of criminal 
justice, is not equipped to solve political problems.77 
 More importantly, when the ICC fails in its role of problem 
solver, it will simultaneously expose itself as a weak authority, thereby 
jeopardizing its ability to enforce international criminal law.78 “To 
start war crimes investigations for the sake of justice at a time when 
the war is not yet over, risks having, in the end, neither justice nor 
peace delivered,” one Ugandan religious representative explained.79 
This is why so many Ugandans believe that the ICC should discon-
tinue its pursuit of the indicted men.80 
 This raises another plausible motivation for the second option 
(dropping the charges and handing sole control of the situation back 
                                                                                                                      
69 See id. 
70 See Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 57, at 395. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 393–95. 
74 See id. 
75 Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 57, at 393–94. 
76 Id. at 395. 
77 See id. 
78See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aff., Uganda: ICC Could Sus-
pend Northern Investigations, Apr. 18, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ 
news/2005/04/mil-050418-irin01.htm. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. 
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over to Uganda): peace.81 Just as there are people who feel that peace 
should never interfere with justice, so are there people who believe 
that justice, or at least the kind doled out by courts, should never in-
terfere with peace.82 In fact, it seems that a growing number of Ugan-
dans adhere to this preference.83 With so much support among the 
people, and with a real possibility of having a nation at peace for the 
first time in decades, Ugandan officials feel that the judges of the ICC 
should reconsider the necessity of the indictments.84 
 Unfortunately, while dismissing the indictments may help Uganda 
achieve peace, it will do absolutely nothing to further the enforcement 
of international justice, the very thing that the ICC was created to do.85 
The time that the ICC spent developing the case, the unprecedented 
issuing of international indictments, and the months spent waiting for 
the wanted men to be apprehended would all be quickly tossed aside.86 
The court would be turning its back on a situation that, according to its 
own conclusions, involved crimes against humanity so egregious that 
they warranted official action.87 Such a move would be utterly damning 
to the ICC: establishing itself, in these early days of its existence, not as a 
trumpeter of justice and truth but instead as a hypocrite who does noth-
ing to stop the violations.88 In the face of this decision, a matter of de-
termining whether the ICC should continue to pursue justice and risk 
further war or step aside in the name of peace and sacrifice its own 
credibility, peace and justice seem to be as incompatible as two goals 
could possibly be.89 
III. Analysis 
 In reality, the situation is not nearly as bleak as the polarized op-
tions may lead one to believe.90 It is true that the ICC is, and ought to 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Cassel, supra note 57. 
82 See Gettleman, supra note 42, at A1. 
83 See id. 
84See id. (“‘We can go to the judges and say there are new circumstances and that the 
indictments are no longer needed,’ said a Ugandan government spokesman, Robert Ka-
bushenga.”). 
85 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.; Thomas Hethe Clark, The Prosecutor of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, Amnesties, and the “Interests of Justice”: Striking a Delicate Balance, 4 
Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 389, 390 (2005). 
86 See Clark, supra note 85; Di Giovanni, supra note 15. 
87 See Clark, supra note 85; Di Giovanni, supra note 15. 
88 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 322–26. 
89 See Clark, supra note 85; Di Giovanni, supra note 15. 
90 See Hanlon, supra note 11, at 336–37. 
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be, actively pursuing the enforcement of international justice.91 It is also 
true that by stepping away from the Uganda situation at this point, the 
ICC may appear more passive and tolerant of violations than a develop-
ing international authority ought to be.92 So while it may seem that pur-
suing justice and backing out of Uganda are contradictory options, 
there may actually be a way to align their interests: empowering the 
court and bringing peace to Uganda.93 Indeed, by using the unique and 
complex circumstances that surround the LRA situation in Uganda, the 
ICC may be able to justify a decision that is very different from that 
which most people would expect from a court of this nature.94 
 Perhaps the most famous instance of international criminal justice 
can be seen in the trials of war criminals before the Nuremburg Military 
Tribunals after World War II.95 There, the tribunals were meticulous in 
the prosecution of every potential offender.96 High ranking officers and 
subordinate soldiers were subject to the same, or at least comparable, 
charges; even doctors who facilitated the Nazi regime were tried at 
Nuremberg.97 
 The same will not ever be said about the pending trials in the 
Uganda situation, for only five men were indicted by the ICC, com-
pared to the dozens of individuals tried at Nuremberg.98 This, of 
course, is a result of the LRA’s bizarre composition: the vast majority of 
the offenders are, or were at some point, also counted among the vic-
tims.99 While the reasoning behind the limited scope of prosecution is 
sound, it does nothing to silence the objections of those who desire 
peace.100 Instead of delaying peace to bring the entire LRA to justice, a 
decision which might have been justifiable, the ICC would be crippling 
peace negotiations in order to bring charges against just five men.101 In 
                                                                                                                      
91 Id. at 336. 
92 See id. 
93 See generally Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 57; Hanlon, supra note 11, at 336–37; 
Udombana, supra note 57; Cassel, supra note 57; Kole, supra note 57. 
94 See generally Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 57; Hanlon, supra note 11, at 336–37; 
Udombana, supra note 57; Cassel, supra note 57; Kole, supra note 57. 
95 See Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Gary Solis, First George S. Prugh Lecture in Military Legal 
History: Judge Advocates, Courts-Martial, and Operational Law Advisors, 190/191 Mil. L. Rev. 
153, 158 (2006). 
96 See id. 
97 See Solis, supra note 95, at 158; Gail H. Javitt, Old Legacies and New Paradigms: Confus-
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fact, since Raska Lukwiya is already dead, and there are reports of both 
Vincent Otti and Dominic Ongwen’s deaths as well, the ICC would be 
subjecting a nation to further violence and torment so that they could 
cling to the possibility of prosecuting as few as two persons.102 Such be-
havior on behalf of the ICC is so reckless that some may count it as a 
human rights violation itself and certainly not in the best interests of 
justice.103 
 The issue of stabilizing the Court’s authority still remains.104 The 
ICC has officially determined that the men at large are, in fact, hu-
man rights violators; it can not simply turn its back on its own conclu-
sions without providing a well reasoned explanation.105 Such an ex-
planation may already exist in the very document which created the 
ICC: the Rome Statute.106 Though not exactly on point, Article 53 dis-
cusses the different factors the Prosecutor is to consider when deter-
mining whether an investigation should be initiated; one of those fac-
tors is whether an investigation and subsequent prosecution is in “the 
interests of justice.”107 At no point beyond Article 53 does the Rome 
Statute indicate that such a consideration is ruled out after the pre-
investigation period; in fact, “the interests of justice” are constantly 
referenced as an ongoing concern of the court throughout the entire 
Rome Statute.108 This fact makes the decision to discontinue plans to 
prosecute the indicted men a much easier one for the Court.109 In-
stead of simply turning its back on the earlier decision to prosecute 
the men, the ICC may now, by the authority of the Court, determine 
that the prosecution of the indicted men would no longer serve the 
“interests of justice.”110 
 This may seem like useless rhetoric, but by having the ability to 
take an active role in its decision making process rather than simply be-
ing bullied by international cries for peace, the ICC gives itself an op-
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portunity to save face.111 Instead of continuing with the prosecutions 
and appearing coldhearted and even inhumane, the ICC can abandon 
the indictments and come across as a benevolent protector of human 
life.112 Furthermore, in making such a decision, the court will no longer 
look spineless and manipulated, but instead wise and decisive.113 As for 
Uganda, it will get exactly what it asked for: the opportunity to have 
peace within its borders for the first time in decades.114 Everybody wins. 
Conclusion 
 This analysis of the ICC’s options in dealing with the LRA case in 
Uganda should help people understand the complexity and poten-
tially life threatening implications that come with the situation. It is 
important for people to understand that the decision to pursue justice 
may at times adversely affect thousands, if not millions, of lives. It is 
equally important to realize that ignoring justice in the name of peace 
very often carries consequences as well. Hopefully, the ICC recognizes 
this balance and finds a way to allow the peace negotiations to con-
tinue without damaging its own practical authority. To date, the court 
has given little indication on what it plans to do with the LRA situa-
tion; only time will tell. 
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